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A
'disappointed' US to keep up defence ties with India
Though
disappointed at India's rejection of Washington's bid to supply a
new generation of fighter jets, the United States has said it
would continue to grow and develop its defence partnership with
India. The New York Times described the decision as a "blow" for
President Barack Obama.
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It took ages for India to decide on
its Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT). Though the British Aerospace (BAe)
Hawk was a consistent frontrunner, the final run-up was enriched
by its intense competition with the Czech-origin Aero Vodochody,
which was acquired by Boeing in its attempt to make inroads into
the Indian military aviation domain. Vodochody even issued a
full-page ad in a national daily as if selling a consumer good.
BAe, though, eventually clinched the deal. Boeing didn't mind, nor
did the US administration, which was then initiating the baby
steps of a strategic partnership with India. Like the AJT, the
race for the Multi-role Medium-Range Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) was
also expected to be eventful, but not to the level that
opinion-makers in one of the countries, whose companies was in
contention, will hold the future of bilateral relations at the
mercy of a commercial (or operational) decision. So too are the
passionate assessments of some Indian analysts, who seem to
postulate that the operational future of the 78-year old Indian
Air Force should be string-tied to the American
military-industrial complex.
It is hard to fathom, even by realist explanations of inter-state
relations, how the Americans could deem it a privileged right to
gain a dominant pie of Indian defence acquisitions as a natural
outcome of the defence cooperation, and at an emotional level, as
a thanksgiving for the nuclear deal. For just a decade back, India
was a pariah for the Pentagon when it comes to technology
transfer, defence sales and dual-use items.
Things have radically changed since the strategic partnership was
initiated and the defence cooperation framework was signed in
2005. From then on, US defence majors have competed to set up shop
in India, hard-sell their products and cultivate influential
decision-makers in the political and military set-up, while
engaging the American political leadership to endow the final
push. Some high-end acquisitions through the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) route also encouraged them to imagine a long-haul
presence, and consequent dominance, in the fastest growing defence
market.
What they probably missed is the hard-mould mindset and
apprehensions influencing a dominant section of India's
bureaucracy and political leadership. While too much has been
suggested about Defence Minister A.K. Antony's purported aversion
to American coziness, little consideration has been given to the
fact that a deep-rooted skepticism runs within South Block when it
comes to defence cooperation with Washington. For, hardly any
discussion on US military sales goes without a reference to the
Sea King embargo. By blocking the British from giving spare parts
for the Indian Navy's grounded Sea King helicopters, Washington
sowed mistrust in the Indian defence establishment, which has been
ceremoniously upheld as a template of American untrustworthiness.
An infamous era of sanctions and export controls on the Indian
defence establishment hardly helped matters. In fact, things have
barely changed on the ground to wipe out these memories.
Washington's hard bargain on end-user verifications, alongside the
push for Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of
Agreement (CISMOA) and the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), have
convinced many in India that defence cooperation with the US will
be a laborious grind - and is an avoidable one at that. The
WikiLeaks revelation of how the establishment succumbed to
Washington's pressure for end-user verifications for the VIP
aircraft to be used by the political leadership has not gone down
well with the polity. Such episodes only hardened the perception
of imperiousness that is identified with Americans on matters
military.
For, even when making a hard sales pitch through governmental
channels, the US defence majors may not have instilled in them the
need for procedural flexibility, and marketing largesse, when it
comes to tapping the world's fastest growing defence market.
Things have neither been encouraging even if we assume strategic
considerations weigh on such decisions.
Washington's refusal to heed India's concerns on giving F-16s to
Pakistan is a potent spoiler which could hardly be compensated by
the P3 Orions or the C-17 Globemasters. That the same aircraft,
which is in Pakistan's frontline inventory, was being aggressively
marketed to India seems a mockery of the strategic calculus. It
then comes as no surprise that India will decide to keep faith on
the highly-reliable French or the European consortium, both coming
with minimal political baggage.
Two things emerge out of this episode as hard facts on the
American system. First, the passionate discontent shown by
Washington, especially the premature exit of the US ambassador,
only strengthens an indomitable sentiment that defence cooperation
could become a thoroughfare to push military sales to India.
Despite assertions to the contrary, the resignation only seemed to
convey the message that one of the key objectives of his posting
was to win this lucrative contract for the American companies,
both of which have tremendous clout in the US with the moneybags
to influence the upcoming presidential campaign.
Second, none of the discourses on the shared values could
masquerade the economic logic and commercial goals that underline
and sustain the strategic partnership with India. That the
president of the United States himself failed in his marketing
push could depress this capitalist economy where every foreign
policy interaction intends to generate an economic spin-off or
promote the business interests of the US corporate colossus.
For, never would an Indian 'socialist' prime minister express
dejection if Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) loses a deal in
the US to a Chinese company.
(The author is
Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New
Delhi. He can be contacted at vinujnu@gmail.com).
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