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              Award 
              winning writer William Dalrymple  | 
                 
                 
              
              New Delhi: Award 
              winning writer William Dalrymple, the author of books like "Nine 
              Lives: In Search of the Sacred in Modern India" and "White Mughals", 
              is exploring the genesis of conflict and western interference in 
              the Afghanistan-Pakistan sector in his new historical treatise 
              "The Return of the King: Shah Shuja and the first Anglo-Afghan 
              War". The book has prompted Dalrymple to return to Afghanistan and 
              Pakistan, the areas he covered as a journalist and a travel writer 
              in his early twenties.  
               
              "History is coming pretty close to repeating itself. My book is a 
              parable of disaster, a modern story of neo-colonial influence in 
              the region. It is the story of the first Anglo (British) Afghan 
              war fought between 1834-1842 and the first ever interference of 
              the west (in the modern context) in Afghanistan," Dalrymple told 
              IANS at the Spring Fever festival, Penguin Books India's annual 
              literature carnival. 
               
              Bulk of the material for the book has been sourced from archives 
              in Kabul and Pakistan and "eight previously unidentified volumes 
              chronicling the history of the period in Urdu and Persian" that 
              Dalrymple purchased from an unknown book-seller in Kabul. 
               
              The documents included two epic poems that were published in 
              Lucknow and Delhi in the run-up to the mutiny of 1857. "It is an 
              extraordinary resource," Dalrymple said.  
               
              According to the writer, the events of 1842 were indirectly 
              responsible for the mutiny of 1857 in India. 
               
              The provocation for the first Anglo-Afghan war dates back to the 
              early years of the great international espionage game in the north 
              western frontiers of the sub-continent in 1837, when Russian and 
              British spies were trying to map the Himalayas and gather 
              intelligence.  
               
              With the Russians expanding towards the British dominion of India, 
              the East India Company, which managed the Crown's affairs in the 
              sub-continent, feared a Russian invasion of India through the 
              Khyber and Bolan passes. The British invaded Afghanistan on the 
              basis of intelligence about a possible invasion furnished by a 
              single Russian envoy.  
               
              It later turned out to be a phantom scare.  
               
              The British sent an envoy to Kabul to form an alliance with the 
              emir of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammed, against Russia. The emir was 
              in favour of an alliance, but wanted the British to help him 
              recapture Peshawar which the Sikhs had captured in 1834.  
               
              The British declined help prompting Dost Muhammed to look to 
              Russia. This led the then governor-general of India Lord Auckland 
              to infer that Dost Muhammed was anti-British. The British decided 
              to install a pro-British Shah Shuja Durrani as the new ruler of 
              Afghanistan. Shah Shuja, whose troubles knew no end, was also in 
              possession of the famous Kohinoor diamond, which was forcibly 
              taken from him by Sikh sovereign Ranjit Singh.  
               
              Dalrymple's book begins in "1843 with an army chaplain, Reverend 
              G.R. Gleigh, who shortly after his return from Afghanistan, sat 
              and wrote his memoirs about his involvement in the greatest 
              military catastrophe".  
               
              "The East India Company sent 18,500 Indian and British troops to 
              Afghanistan in 1842. Only one man survived the campaign, making it 
              back to Jalalabad on a horse. Not one benefit, military or 
              political, was acquired with the war. It was waged on doctored 
              intelligence," Dalrymple said quoting from his book, which 
              documents Gleigh's accounts.  
               
              The germ of the book was sown last year while Dalrymple was 
              writing an opinion article for the New York Times. 
               
              The writer said he was reminded about the similarities between the 
              current situation in Afghanistan and the Anglo-Afghan war, which 
              triggered more than a century of foreign interference in the 
              region.  
               
              "The economic realities which determine the way the war has gone 
              are very similar (between the past and present). The reality is 
              Afghanistan is still so poor. Moreover, Afghan president Hamid 
              Karzai is from the sub-clan as that of Shah Shuja," Dalrymple 
              said.  
               
              In an opinion article in the UK-based New Statesman, Dalrymple 
              wrote: "It is difficult to imagine the current military adventure 
              ending as badly as the first Afghan war, an abortive experiment in 
              the 'great game colonialism' that descended into what was arguably 
              the greatest humiliation ever suffered by the west in the east." 
               
              "An entire army of what was then the most powerful military nation 
              in the world was utterly routed and destroyed by poorly equipped 
              tribesmen at the cost of 15 million pounds and more than 40,000 
              lives," Dalrymple said.  
               
              "Once again, 10 years on from NATO's modern invasion of 
              Afghanistan, there are increasing signs that Britain's fourth war 
              in the country could end with as few political gains as the first 
              three," Dalrymple said. 
              
                
              
                
              
                
              
                
              
                
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